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Tax Credits on Federally Created 
Exchanges: Lessons from a Legislative 
Process Failure Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation 
Mark Seidenfeld† 
Opponents to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA or Act) have mounted yet another seemingly 
formidable challenge to basic provisions of the Act, focusing on 
whether the Act authorizes insurance premium tax credits for 
individuals who obtain insurance on an American Health 
Benefit Exchange (Exchange) established by the federal 
government. The argument against construing the Act to allow 
such tax subsidies depends largely on applying technical tools 
of statutory interpretation, usually associated with the Textual 
school of interpretation, to various provisions of the Act to 
discern that the best objective reading authorizes premium tax 
credits only to individuals who purchase insurance on 
Exchanges established by the state in which the Exchange 
operates.  
This issue has the potential to destabilize the operation of 
the ACA in the 36 states that did not set up their own 
Exchanges.1  The Affordable Care Act has been described as a 
three legged stool that can stand only by imposing obligations 
on insurers and individuals, while providing subsidies to make 
 
 † Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State 
University College of Law.  I owe great thanks to the stupendous and quick 
research assistance of Aaron Retteen and Sarah Logan Beasley. I would also 
like to thank Jonathan Adler, Steve Johnson, and Marshall Kapp for 
comments that helped me improve this Essay. Copyright © 2015 by Mark 
Seidenfeld.  
 1. Thirty-six states had not established their own exchanges as of 
November 7, 2014, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the 
issue addressed by this Essay. See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear New 
Challenge to Health Law, NY TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/11/08/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-new-challenge-to-health-
law.html?_r=0.  
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insurance more affordable.2  Eliminating any one of these three 
legs would undermine the operation of insurance markets and 
thereby doom the ACA to failure.3  In addition, the ACA 
imposes an obligation on large employers,4 which is crucial to 
maintain current broad based coverage of those who are 
employed as well as to reduce the net government cost of 
keeping insurance affordable.5  The Act burdens insurers to 
provide insurance without regard to health related conditions 
of the insured.6 Individuals with preexisting conditions cannot 
be denied insurance; in addition, insurance premiums can only 
take two health related factors into account: age and whether 
the individual smoked tobacco, and the ACA limits even the 
extent to which these factors can affect rates.7 Insurers can 
only meet this burden at an affordable price if young, healthy 
individuals, who do not generate anywhere near the level of 
claims that older and infirm individuals do, can be induced to 
purchases insurance at rates above the expected cost of their 
claims, essentially providing a cross-subsidy of insurance for 
the elderly and frail.8   
The ACA provides a premium tax credit to any individual 
whose household income is between 100% and 400% of the 
poverty level, and who purchases insurance on an Exchange.9 
 
 2. Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool” The 
Costs of Partially Repealing the Affordable Care Act, 1-2 (CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, Aug. 2010), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp 
-content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf   (“Critics who 
propose to ‘repeal and replace’ the Affordable Care Act don't seem to 
understand that all three legs of the stool are critical for reform. Pulling out 
any of the legs while leaving one or two intact will critically undercut gains 
from reform.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2014). 
 5. See Riley Lovendale, Note, Tax vs. Penalty, Round Two: Interpreting 
the ACA’s Assessable Payment As a Tax for Federal Award Cost Allowances, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 947, 977 (2014) (claiming that the ACA’s employer mandate was 
meant “explicitly to strengthen the private employer-provided health 
insurance market in order to achieve its goal of near-universal health 
coverage”); see also Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer 
Mandate: Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 155, 156–57 
(1994) (discussing an employer mandate as a means for the federal 
government to “fund” health care cost increases well before consideration of 
the ACA). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2014). 
 7. Id. (further noting that rates can vary based on whether the plan is 
for an individual or family and the geographical area). 
 8. Gruber, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 9. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (adding § 36B to the Internal Revenue Code). 
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Without this subsidy, many individuals would simply not be 
able to afford to purchase health insurance.10  Even if an 
individual could afford insurance, she may choose not to 
purchase it if she perceives the benefit she will derive from it as 
less than its cost.  Hence, premium tax credits increase the 
attractiveness of insurance to those who do not envision 
incurring significant health care costs.11  The ACA further 
encourages individual purchase of insurance by requiring 
individuals to pay a penalty if they fail to purchase insurance.12 
But, individuals who would have to pay more than eight 
percent of their income to purchase the cheapest plan on their 
relevant Exchange are exempt from this penalty.13  Without the 
premium tax credit, the cost of insurance for many individuals 
would exceed the eight percent trigger for the exemption, 
relieving them of their obligation to obtain insurance.14 In 
short, without premium subsidies, millions of young and 
healthy Americans would not face penalties for failure to 
purchase insurance and many others would simply pay the 
penalties and not purchase it.   
The ability of financially qualified individuals to obtain 
premium subsidies also affects employers’ incentives to offer 
insurance to their workers under the Act. The ACA did not 
mean to alter the fundamental method by which the vast 
majority of individuals in the United States obtain health 
insurance – from their employers.  But the incentives for 
 
 10. See Brendan S. Mahar & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the 
Constitution: How States Can Regulate Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 275, 294 (2013) (“The ACA addresses the affordability [of health 
insurance] through use of subsidies for those at low-income levels.”); Amy B. 
Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 781, 783 (2011)  (“In order to make coverage more affordable, 
individuals with household income below 400% FPL are eligible for refundable 
tax credits that subsidize insurance purchase.”).  
 11. See David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax 
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent 
Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 
685 (2012) (noting that tax credits are carrots to encourage those who 
otherwise would not purchase insurance to do so). 
 12. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). 
 13. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A). The eight percent figure is calculated 
based on the individual’s “required contribution,” which is essentially the 
individual’s cost of insurance net of any premium tax credit.  26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(e)(1)(B).    
 14. See Amy B. Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health Insurance 
Content Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 144 (2012) (discussing the 
relationship of the ACA’s premium subsidies to its individual mandate to 
purchase insurance). 
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employers to provide insurance as an employee benefit 
decreases if workers can obtain affordable insurance on the 
Exchanges.  For this reason, the ACA subjects large employers 
– those with 50 or more full time workers or the equivalent – to 
monetary penalties for failing to provide adequate insurance to 
their full time employees.15  But, the penalty provision is 
triggered only if an employee who is eligible to purchase 
insurance on an Exchange does so, and receives a subsidy 
under the Act.16  Essentially, in states that have not establish 
their own Exchanges, limiting entitlement to tax credits 
removes any teeth from the sanction against large employers 
who flout the employer “mandate.” 
It is no exaggeration to surmise that the economic viability 
of the ACA in the 36 states that have not created their own 
exchanges depends on the availability of subsidies to 
individuals who purchase insurance on federally created state 
Exchanges. Thus, the lack of availability of tax credits on 
federally created Exchanges would seriously undermine the 
most fundamental goal of the Act – universal health care 
coverage – and potentially entirely destabilize the market for 
individual insurance in those states.  And the failure of the 
ACA in those states could seriously threaten to damn it 
politically in the 14 states that set up their own exchanges.   
This Essay advocates that the question of whether 
individuals who purchase insurance on federally created 
exchanges are eligible for tax credits should be interpreted 
using a recently proposed method of reading statutes – the 
“legislative process failure theory of statutory interpretation.”17 
Under this theory, courts should not rely on traditional judicial 
methods of interpreting statutory provisions, especially 
technical application of Textualist tools of interpretation, when 
 
 15. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H. 
 16. The ACA imposes penalties on a large employer if any of its employees 
purchase insurance on an Exchange and qualify for premium tax credits or 
reduced cost sharing. Id.  Unlike the section governing premium tax credits, 
the section providing for cost sharing reductions does not expressly limit those 
subsidies to the Exchange established by the state. 42 U.S.C. § 18071. But, 
cost sharing subsidies are available only during coverage months, 42 U.S.C. § 
18071(f)(2), and the reduced cost sharing provisions use the definition of 
coverage month specified in the section governing premium tax credits, 42 
U.S.C. § 18071(f)(1). That definition refers explicitly to the Exchange 
established by the state under section 1311. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(a). 
 17. This theory is set out in detail and defended in Mark Seidenfeld, A 
Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
467 (2014). 
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those methods lead to a “best meaning” that likely was not the 
meaning that most legislators ascribed to the provision.  In 
such instances, courts should pay more attention to contextual 
clues to legislators’ likely understanding of the statutory 
provision, including legislative history. With respect to tax 
credits for purchasers on federally created exchanges, this 
Essay concludes that the fact that virtually no one seemed to be 
aware, when the ACA was passed, that it could be read to 
preclude such subsidies strongly supports reading the statute 
to authorize them.  
I.  PREMIUM TAX CREDITS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT   
A. THE TEXT OF THE PREMIUM SUBSIDY PROVISIONS OF THE 
ACA 
There are three provisions of the ACA that directly relate 
to the question of whether individuals who enroll in insurance 
plans via federally created Exchanges may receive subsidies.  
First, Section 1311, which specifies requirements that 
Exchanges must meet under the Act, provides that “Each state 
shall . . .  establish an American Health Benefit Exchange 
(referred to in this title as an ‘Exchange’).”18  Second, if a state 
fails to do so, Section 1321 requires the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to establish and operate “such Exchange” in 
that state, and requires federally run Exchanges to meet the 
requirements Section 1311 imposes on state-established 
Exchanges.19  Third, Section 1401 provides for premium 
assistance tax credits for taxpayers with incomes between 
100% and 400% of the poverty level.20 The potential 
interpretive problem arises because of the interrelationship 
between tax credits and the Exchanges required by Section 
1311.  The amount of the tax credit depends on the monthly 
premiums the taxpayer pays for qualified health plans 
“enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State 
under 1311.”21   
 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012). Section 1562 of the Act, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(21) (2012), defines “Exchange” as “an American Health 
Benefit Exchange established under section 18031 of this title.” 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012). 
 20. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1) (2012). 
 21. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
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The IRS has issued regulations interpreting the ACA to 
authorize premium subsidies for individuals who obtain 
insurance on federally created Exchanges.22 Because the ACA’s 
provisions regarding the amount of credits to which an 
individual is entitled refers to plans “which were enrolled in 
through an Exchange established by the State under 1311,”23 
some opponents of the Act, most notably and comprehensively 
Jonathan Adler and Michael Cannon, have argued that 
subsidies are not authorized for taxpayers who enrolled in 
plans purchased on Exchanges established by the federal 
government under Section 1321.24  The Fourth Circuit, 
considering a petition for review asserting that the regulations 
exceeded the IRS’s authority, recently affirmed the IRS 
interpretation.25 On the same day, however, a panel of the DC 
Circuit reversed the IRS interpretation.26  Subsequently, the 
entire DC Circuit vacated its panel’s decision, and scheduled 
the case for hearing en banc.27 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme 
Court granted cert to hear the issue.28   
At first blush, the language of the ACA suggests that 
federally created Exchanges are included in the term 
“American Health Benefit Exchange” as used in Section 1311.  
The key language is the provision in Section 1321 that if a state 
fails to establish a qualified Exchange, the federal government 
is responsible to set up “such Exchange,”29 along with the 
provision in Section 1311 that “Exchange” refers to those 
required to be established by states.30  The most natural 
reading of these two fairly straightforward provisions, suggests 
that a federally run Exchange in a state substitutes in all 
 
 22. See Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30377, 30378 
(May 23, 2012) (explaining why the IRS interpreted the ACA to authorize 
premium tax credits on federally facilitated Exchanges). 
 23. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A). 
 24. See generally Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation 
Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits under the 
PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119 (2013).  
 25. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 375–76 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. granted, 
135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
 26. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc 
granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 
2014). 
 27. Halbig v. Burwell, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181, at *1. 
 28. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (Nov. 7, 2014). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012). 
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respects for a qualified Exchange established by the state.31  
This reading is also most consistent with the overall structure 
of the Act, and there is no provision of the Act that directly 
demands a different reading.32 
If, however, one applies a technical reading of the Act, 
characteristic of the approach that Textualists use,33 that 
initial impression becomes less certain.  Section 1401 of the Act 
provides that the total annual credit to which a taxpayer is 
entitled is the sum of the credits for each “coverage month,” 
which means: “any month if— (i) as of the first day of such 
month the taxpayer . . . is covered by a qualified health plan . . . 
that was enrolled in through an Exchange established by the 
State under section 1311 . . . .”34  The one other provision of 
Section 1401 specifying the amount of the tax credit also 
includes explicit reference to an “Exchange established by the 
state under [section] 1311.”35  Using the canon that courts 
should not read language in a statute as mere surplusage,36 a 
judge could credit the consistent inclusion of “established by 
the state under section 1311” in Section 1401 to conclude that 
the tax credit is available only in states that set up their own 
Exchanges.   
By contrast, other provisions in Section 1401 that do not 
refer to tax credits simply use the term “Exchange,”37 
suggesting that the qualifier “established by the State under 
section 1311” was meant to distinguish state from federally 
established exchanges. Furthermore, Section 1421, which 
governs tax subsidies to small businesses that offer 
 
 31. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 412–27 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
 32. In fact, Adler and Cannon themselves admit that, “[i]t may be 
somewhat surprising that the PPACA contains such a gaping hole in its 
regulatory scheme. We were both surprised to discover this feature of the law 
and initially characterized it as a ‘glitch.’  Yet our further research 
demonstrates that this feature was intentional and purposeful and that the 
IRS’s rule has no basis in law.”  Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 123 
(emphasis added). 
 33. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from 
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM L. REV. 70 (2006); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2006). 
 34. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 35. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 36. The canon disfavoring surplusage counsels that “[a] statute should be 
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 
88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 37. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(B)(i), (d)(3)(B), (e)(3) (2012). 
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contributions to their employees who enroll in a qualified 
health plan, uses the term “Exchange” without qualifying 
whether such Exchange is established by the state or the 
federal government.38 Thus, relying on the canon that different 
language in different sections of a statute should be read to 
signal that Congress intended that the sections operate 
differently, Adler and Cannon argue that this inconsistency 
demonstrates that the small business subsidy, but not a 
taxpayer credit, was meant to be available in states where with 
federally run Exchanges.39  Finally, Section 1321 explicitly 
provides that the Secretary shall ensure that federally 
established Exchanges meet those requirements imposed on 
Exchanges set up by the states,40 but it does not mention the 
tax benefits that those Exchanges provide. Relying on the 
expressio unius canon,41 one could conclude that the ACA 
meant to impose the same requirements on state and federally-
run Exchanges, but not to confer the same benefits on them.  
For Adler and Cannon, these Textualist tools render the 
statutory meaning clear.42   
The Halbig panel majority did not find these provisions 
quite as clear as did Adler and Cannon. But the panel used its 
own technical reading of the language of the Act to find 
problems with the government’s reliance on the use of the 
language “such Exchange” in Section 1321.  First, the panel 
majority admitted that “‘such’ conveys what a federal Exchange 
is: the equivalent of the Exchange a state would have 
established had it elected to do so.”43  The panel also accepted 
that Section 1321’s reference to the Exchange described under 
Section 1311, along with the reference of Section 1311 in the 
definition of Exchange, was sufficient to render federally 
established exchanges to be Exchanges under Section 1311.  To 
quote the panel’s language: 
If we import that definition into the text of section 1321, 
the provision directs the Secretary to “establish . . . such 
 
 38. 26 U.S.C. § 45R (2012).  
 39. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 133–42.  
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (2012). 
 41. The full maxim is, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” which 
means that “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, 
or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).    
 42. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 143–48. 
 43. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc 
granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 
2014). 
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American Health Benefit Exchange established under [section 
1311 of the ACA] within the State.” This suggests not only that 
the Secretary is to establish the type of exchange described in 
section 1311, but also that when she does so, she acts under 
section 1311, even though her authority appears in section 
1321. Thus, section 1321 creates equivalence between state and 
federal Exchanges in two respects: in terms of what they are 
and the statutory authority under which they are established.44  
But the panel did not see how the statutory provisions 
could allow a federally established Exchange to qualify as one 
established by a state.45 
The panel’s reasoning, however, essentially ignores the 
canons of interpretation on which Adler and Cannon based 
their interpretation. Those canons would lead to the same 
conclusion with respect to inclusion of the phrase “under 
section 1311” as they would with respect to “established by a 
state.” Thus, the panel relied instead on a very fine parsing of 
complicated language in a manner that would not be obvious to 
one simply reading the statute.  
The technical Textualist analysis gets even more 
complicated when one looks to other provisions of the ACA.  
Perhaps the most problematic provision for those who claim 
subsidies are not available to a purchaser on a federally created 
Exchange is use of the term “qualified individual,” in the 
section of the Act titled “Consumer Choice.”46  A provision in 
that section reads: “In general The term ‘qualified individual’ 
means, with respect to an Exchange, an individual who— (i) is 
seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan in the individual 
market offered through the Exchange; and (ii) resides in the 
State that established the Exchange.”47  As the United States 
argued in Halbig, if federally created Exchanges are different 
from those established by the state, Exchanges in the 36 states 
that did not set up their own Exchanges have no qualified 
individuals.48  The government read this to mean that there 
 
 44. Id. at 399–400. 
 45. Id. at 400. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 18032 (2012). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012). 
 48. See Brief for Members of Congress and State Legislatures as Amici 
Curiae Supporting  Respondents, Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (No. 14-5018), 2014 WL 5585306; Halbig, 758 F.3d at 404. 
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would be no individuals who could purchase insurance on 
federally created Exchanges.49   
The Halbig panel majority parried this argument by noting 
that, although the Act authorizes qualified individuals to 
purchase insurance on their relevant Exchange, nothing in the 
Act states that only qualified individuals can purchase 
insurance on Exchanges.50  The panel supported its view that 
non-qualified individuals can purchase insurance on Exchanges 
by noting that the very provision cited by the government to 
support its argument makes clear that incarcerated individuals 
are excluded from being qualified individuals, but then implies 
that such individuals are allowed to enroll in plans purchased 
on an Exchange.51 That provision excludes a person from being 
a qualified individual if the person is incarcerated “at the time 
of enrollment.”52  The panel seemed to ignore the natural 
reading of that provision, which recognizes that the phrase, “at 
the time of enrollment,” signifies the point in time at which the 
Exchange must analyze whether an individual is excluded from 
the Exchange because he is incarcerated.53 The panel, however, 
might have further supported its reading by referring to the 
last sentence in the section which states that an alien who is 
not lawfully in the United States “shall not be treated as a 
qualified individual and may not be covered under a qualified 
health plan in the individual market that is offered through an 
Exchange.”54  If only qualified individuals are entitled to be 
insured under a plan purchased on an Exchange, then there is 
no need for the phrase indicating that such aliens may not be 
covered by such a plan. Moreover, this provision stands in 
contrast to that involving incarcerated individuals, which does 
not explicitly address the coverage of such individuals under a 
plan offered on an Exchange.  
From a Textualist standpoint, however, the panel’s reading 
that non-qualified individuals may be covered by insurance 
offered on an Exchange poses a problem because it removes any 
significance from the term “qualified individual.” If any 
 
 49. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 404. 
 50. Id. at 404–05. 
 51. Id. at 405. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Adrienne Kendall, Statutory Interpretation and the Affordable Care 
Act Tax Credit Debate 22–23 (2015) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2012). 
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individual, whether qualified or not, can purchase insurance on 
an Exchange, being a qualified individual makes no difference, 
yet the statute uses the term in several provisions.55 Under the 
panel’s reading, every one of these provisions would have the 
same legal effect if the phrase “qualified individual” were 
changed simply to “individual” or dropped from the provision 
entirely.  In fact, several instances in which the statute uses 
the term strongly suggest that only qualified individuals can 
purchase insurance on Exchanges.56 Thus, by declining to 
impute the word “only” to eligibility of qualified individuals to 
purchase insurance on Exchanges, the panel essentially read 
the term “qualified individual” out of the statute.  Even worse, 
the panel’s reading would allow any individual to purchase 
insurance on any Exchange, including those outside the state 
in which the individual resides, because the only restriction the 
ACA places on out of state participation in an Exchange applies 
to qualified individuals “with respect to an Exchange.”57 
Therefore, in a bizarre twist, the panel’s reading would seem to 
allow individuals in states that did not set up their own 
exchanges to obtain subsidies by purchasing insurance on an 
Exchange in a state that did establish its own Exchange.   
B.LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REGARDING THE PREMIUM SUBSIDY 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACA 
The Textualist paradigm of applying technical tools to find 
the objective meaning of statutory text suggests that the IRS 
interpretation may be a better reading of statute than that of 
Adler and Cannon, and the Halbig panel.  But the meaning 
 
 55. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15; 42 U.S.C. § 18931(c)(1)(F).  The term 
does have significance independent of allowing an individual to purchase 
insurance on an Exchange in the part of Section 10103 of the Act that amends 
Section 2709 of the Public Health Services Act, which governs participation in 
medical clinical trials. But that Section explicitly includes a separate 
definition of “qualified individual.”  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8(b). 
 56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(c)(F) (2012) (allowing states to merge 
individual and small employer Exchanges to serve “qualified individuals and 
qualified employers”); 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A) (2012) (“An Exchange shall 
make available qualified health plans to qualified individuals and qualified 
employers.”); 42 U.S.C. § 18051(e)(2) (2012) (providing that an individual 
eligible for state established basic health program for individuals not eligible 
for Medicaid “shall not be treated as a qualified individual under section 
18032 eligible for enrollment in a qualified health plan offered through an 
Exchange established under section 18031.”). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘qualified individual’ 
means, with respect to an Exchange, an individual who . . . (ii) resides in the 
State that established the Exchange . . . .”). 
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seems to be far from clear.  Given the ambiguity of the Act, a 
judge might look to legislative history for guidance about 
whether Congress intended for purchasers of insurance on 
federally established Exchanges to be eligible for premium 
subsidies.58  The Halbig panel, which found the text clear, did 
not find any legislative history relevant to this specific 
interpretative question. Adler and Cannon, however, claim that 
the legislative history supports their view of the unavailability 
of tax credits in states without state established Exchanges.59  
Ultimately, Adler and Cannon are on shaky ground in their 
reading of legislative history.   
Adler and Cannon contend that Congress intentionally 
structured the ACA to deny benefits to taxpayers who enroll in 
insurance plans via federally run Exchanges to encourage 
states to establish exchanges.60 The only direct evidence they 
find of such intent is a paper written by Professor Timothy Jost 
and posted to the internet “well before PPACA supporters first 
introduced any legislation.”61  This paper shows a general 
awareness of the potential for conditioning tax subsidies on 
states setting up qualifying exchanges to encourage the states 
to do so.62  But, it shows nothing more.  The article was not 
part of the legislative process and actually proposed conditional 
authorization of taxpayer subsidies as an alternative to the 
federal government setting up a fallback program of 
 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 96–97 (2d Cir. 
2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1281 (2014) (“In the event that the text of a 
statute is not clear, a court interpreting the statute may consult the legislative 
history to discern ‘the legislative purpose as revealed by the history of the 
statute.’” (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers 
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508  U.S. 602, 627 (1993))); James v. Wadas, 724 
F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur task is to determine Congress' intent, 
beginning with the plain language of the statute itself . . . . If, however, the 
text is ambiguous, we inquire further to discern Congress’ intent looking to the 
legislative history and underlying public policy of the statute.” (citations 
omitted)); Grant Thornton, LLP v. Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 514 
F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting use of legislative history because 
the statute was ”clear enough”); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990) (“[Under] the Court’s 
‘traditional’ approach: The plain meaning of a statute governs its 
interpretation, unless negated by strongly contradictory legislative history.”). 
 59. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 148–57. 
 60. Id. at 142–43. 
 61. Id. at 143, 153–55 & n.129. 
 62. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues, 37 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 53, 56 (2009).   
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administering exchanges.63  In fact, Congress clearly chose to 
have HHS set up a fallback program. Of course, it is possible 
that Congress intended to both set up a fall back program and 
use conditional subsidies to encourage states to set up 
exchanges, but it is just as possible that it did not.  
Adler and Cannon cite three pieces of legislative history 
that they argue directly support their interpretation. The first 
piece is the version of the health care bill that was passed by 
the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) 
Committee.64  The provisions of that bill – the Affordable 
Health Choices Act of 2009 – was not the progenitor of the 
relevant sections of the ACA. Nonetheless, there is value in 
engaging its legislative history to show that it does not support 
Adler and Cannon’s conclusion that it evidences congressional 
intent to hold states hostage to tax credits in order to 
encourage them to establish “Gateways” – the bill’s equivalent 
to exchanges.  That bill distinguished between a state that 
established its own Gateway (an establishing state), one that 
asked the federal government to establish a Gateway in the 
state (a participating state), and a state that refused to 
participate in the setting up of a Gateway in the state.65  The 
bill would have denied tax credits to individuals in establishing 
states until three conditions were met: (1) the Secretary 
determined that the Gateway met the bill’s requirements, (2) 
the state had enacted legislation imposing regulations required 
by the bill on the state’s individual and small-group health 
insurance markets; (3) the state had enacted legislation 
making state and local governments subject to the employer 
insurance mandate.66  For participating states, the bill denied 
tax credits until conditions 2 and 3 were met; for those states 
not participating, the bill would have denied tax credits until 
condition 3 was met.67   
The notion that the tax credits were used to encourage 
states to cooperate in implementing the bill’s provisions is 
belied by the fact that the greater the state cooperation, the 
greater the number of conditions that had to be met before 
 
 63. Id. (“Alternatively, [Congress] could . . . [offer] tax subsidies for 
insurance only in states that [comply] with federal requirements . . . .”).   
 64. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 154–56. (discussing the HELP Bill, 
Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. (2009)). 
 65. Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 3104(a)(1)-(2) 
(2009).  
 66. Id. at §3104(a)-(b).  
 67. Id. at §3104(a)-(c).  
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purchasers on the state’s Gateway could receive the credits.  
This suggests that the impetus behind the conditions were to 
ensure that the insurance market in the state met the criteria 
set out by the bill before subsidies would flow to the state; it did 
not matter whether those criteria were met because of federal 
or state action.  Under the ACA, however, once the federal 
government establishes an Exchange in a state, there is 
nothing more a state must do to ensure that the insurance 
markets meet the Act’s goals.  Hence, if anything, the structure 
of the tax credit provisions under the Affordable Health 
Choices bill suggests that federally created Exchanges would 
qualify for tax credits once they meet the criteria for Exchanges 
under the Act. This is precisely the same criteria that apply 
under the ACA for tax credits on state established Exchanges.  
The absence of separate treatment of tax credits for federally 
created Exchanges likely simply reflected the lack of need for 
separate provisions to govern such tax credits.  
The second piece of legislative history that Adler and 
Cannon cite as direct support for their reading of the statute is 
a colloquy between Senator Max Baucus, chairman of the 
Finance Committee, and Senator John Ensign, a republican 
from Nevada.68 The Finance Committee’s reported bill, The 
Healthy Future Act of 2009, included the relevant language 
that became the ACA, so this colloquy is more directly on point 
in assessing the final statute.69  The colloquy addressed the 
question of how the Finance Committee could have jurisdiction 
to impose conditions on how states set up their Exchanges.  
Senator Baucus responded that the key was tax credits.70  The 
fact that qualified state Exchanges would receive tax credits 
meant that the conditions on qualification triggered federal 
government spending, giving the Committee jurisdiction.  Adler 
and Cannon essentially argue that if the federal fallback 
program also would entitle taxpayer participants to tax credits, 
 
 68. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 155–57 (citing Executive Committee 
Meeting to Consider Health Care Reform: Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
111th Cong. 326 (2009)). 
 69. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 154. 
 70. Executive Committee Meeting to Consider Health Care Reform: Before 
the S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong. 326 (2009), available at http://www 
.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/download/?id=c6a0c668-37d9-4955-861c-
50959b0a8392; see also Executive Committee Meeting to Consider an Original 
Bill Providing for Health Care Reform: Before the S. Comm. on Finance, C-
SPAN (starting at 2:53:21) (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/ 
program/289085-4.  
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then the credits would be universally available and the state 
qualifications would not trigger tax credits, thereby denying 
the Finance Committee jurisdiction to impose conditions on 
states.71   
Adler and Cannon, however, seem to have ignored the 
option of insurance purchased off any ACA Exchange.  If such 
insurance does not have to meet conditions imposed on plans 
offered through qualified exchanges,72 then it might underprice 
plans sold on qualified Exchanges even if the qualified 
Exchange is federally established.  The tax subsidy may be 
crucial to allow plans on qualified Exchanges, whether federal 
or state run, to meet the regulations adopted under section 
1311(c)(1) and still compete effectively.  Most significantly, the 
conditions on state Exchanges would still place the legislation 
within the Finance Committee’s jurisdiction because those 
conditions were not universal, but rather were granted only to 
qualified Exchanges (whether established by the state or HHS) 
and not to products sold outside of qualified Exchanges. In 
particular, the tax subsidies comprise a mechanism to ensure 
that plans sold through ACA Exchanges would be able to 
compete with plans sold on any competing exchange that would 
not have to comply with criteria set out in section 1311 and 
regulations under that section   
The third potentially relevant piece of legislative history 
that Adler and Cannon discuss is a letter that the Texas 
Democratic Delegation to the House of Representatives sent to 
President Obama, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and 
House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, expressing concern about 
the Senate bill as the basis for the ACA.73  The gist of the letter 
is that the House Bill, which would have offered a federally run 
national health exchange to compete with state run exchanges, 
would protect against state recalcitrance in implementing the 
Act.74 The letter expressed concerns that under the Senate bill, 
Texans would be “shortchange[d]” because the state would set 
up “weak, state-based health insurance exchanges.”75  It goes 
 
 71. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 157. 
 72. Those criteria are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1), but are in 
addition to requirements adopted by the Secretary under that subsection.  
 73. See Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at n.21, (discussing U.S. Rep. 
Doggett: Settling for Second-Rate Health Care Doesn’t Serve Texans, MY 
HARLINGEN NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.myharlingennews.com/p=6426 
(reprinting the letter) [hereinafter Doggett Letter]). 
 74. Doggett Letter, supra note 73. 
 75.  Id. 
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on to describe in detail how the state could increase complexity 
and reduce purchasers’ market leverage as well as set up 
“multiple exchanges,” including only “one or two dominant 
insurers.”76  It does opine that under the Senate bill, “millions 
of people will be left no better off than before Congress acted,” 
but it does so after noting that Texas has experienced difficult 
budget years and in response reduced its Medicaid program, 
implying that states will similarly weaken their investment in 
the exchanges.77 The only mention of subsidies comes in one 
sentence near the end of the letter, which merely states that 
under the House bill: “A single, national health insurance 
exchange will not only administer federal affordability credits 
and receive federal start-up funds, but will also be charged 
with enforcing federal laws and regulations.”78  What is 
significant about the letter is its focus on fears that states 
would not adequately fund the operation of qualified Exchanges 
or hold them to the requirements of the Act, and its failure to 
mention differential availability of tax credits under the Senate 
bill.   
II.  LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE THEORY OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION   
The analysis of relevant ACA provisions indicates that 
Textualist methods of statutory interpretation provide several 
countervailing arguments about whether the ACA permits tax 
credits for individuals who enroll in plans via federally created 
Exchanges.  Therefore, reasonable judges could disagree about 
the resolution of that question, in which case the IRS should 
prevail under step two of Chevron.79  Some judges, however, 
subscribe to a more active role at step one of Chevron.  For 
example, Justice Scalia has stated that he is less likely than 
non-textual judges to find a statute to be ambiguous at step one 
of Chevron.80  Essentially, if Scalia is fairly confident that he 
has found a best objective meaning, then he will find the 
statute unambiguous even if reasonable judges could disagree.  
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Under Chevron, reviewing courts first determine whether Congress 
has spoken to the precise question the agency has addressed, and if not, they 
are to defer to the agency interpretation if reasonable. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 80. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (1989).  
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The legislative process failure theory of statutory 
interpretation, however, counsels that the tax credit provision 
of the ACA should be interpreted in light of the strong 
contextual evidence of legislators’ likely subjective 
understanding of the tax credit provisions, even by a judge who 
otherwise would use technical interpretive tools. This Essay 
advocates that the question of whether individuals who 
purchase insurance on federally created exchanges are eligible 
for tax credits should be interpreted using a recently proposed 
method of reading statutes – the “‘legislative process failure’ 
theory of statutory interpretation.” 81 Under this theory, courts 
should not rely on traditional judicial methods of interpreting 
statutory provisions, especially technical application of 
Textualist tools of interpretation, when those methods lead to a 
“best meaning” that likely was not the meaning that most 
legislators ascribed to the provision.82  In such instances, courts 
should pay more attention to contextual clues to legislators’ 
likely understanding of the statutory provision, including 
legislative history. With respect to tax credits for purchasers on 
federally created exchanges, this Essay concludes that the fact 
that virtually no one seemed to be aware, when the ACA was 
passed, that it could be read to preclude such subsidies strongly 
supports reading the statute to authorize them.  
A. JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETIVE METHODS 
The legislative process failure theory of statutory 
interpretation is predicated on the observation that the courts 
and Congress comprise different interpretive communities that 
use different methods for attaching meaning to statutes.83 Our 
constitutional system assigns the fundamental role of making 
law to the legislature.  Hence, any interpretive method that 
undermines legislative supremacy in determining the meaning 
of statutes is constitutionally troubling.84 Legislative 
 
 81. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 467.  
 82. Id. at 494–95. 
 83. Id. at 529. 
 84. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative 
State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory 
Interpretation, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 1239, 1251 (2002) (“The legitimacy of judicial 
power over statutory interpretation has long been thought to flow from this 
assumption that judges would implement Congress’s decisions.”); John F. 
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24–
25 (2001) (proposing that the proper role for judges interpreting statutes is as 
faithful agents of the legislature); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation 
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supremacy does not mandate that courts acquiesce in the 
legislative method for determining statutory meaning in every, 
or perhaps even many, cases.  It does require, however, that the 
two branches coordinate their means of interpreting statutes to 
make their two distinct methods for determining meaning 
compatible.   
Judges usually begin interpreting a statute by reading its 
text, and forming some notion of the most likely meaning, or 
perhaps rough probabilities that the words take on any of 
several possible meanings.  Judges then look seriatim to other 
indications of statutory meaning. 85  These include semantic 
canons of interpretation, which describe some generalizable 
norms about how language ordinarily is used.  They also 
include inquiries into the structure of statutes — for example 
how the precise wording fits within wording of other sections, 
or even other statutes, looking for telling similarities and 
differences from terms whose meanings are well accepted. 
Judges will also look to policy canons, which affect how the 
courts read statutes in order to effectuate underlying 
assumptions about how our legal system should operate. If 
these tools do not reveal a best objective meaning of the 
statutory language, judges might look at more contextual clues 
to find the best meaning of the language enacted into law. 
Textualists will stop there, while purposivist judges are willing 
to consult legislative history to determine a meaning that 
members of Congress likely gave to the statutory provision at 
issue.86 But even judges willing to consider legislative intent 
rarely use intent or general purpose revealed in legislative 
history to override what they deem to be clear textual meaning 
derived by application of technical tools of interpretation.87  
 
and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 284 (1989) (“Legislative 
supremacy, as a doctrine of statutory interpretation, is grounded in the notion 
that . . .  courts are subordinate to legislatures.”). 
 85. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 495–96 (describing judicial methods of 
statutory interpretation as exercises in Bayesian probability updating). 
 86. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 37 (2006) (“[T]extualist scholars often criticize purposivists for 
employing context in order to adjust or even contradict a statute’s clear 
textual meaning”);  John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2388, 2434 n.179  (2003) (“[T]he modern textualists’ concerns come into 
play only when courts use background statutory purpose to contradict or vary 
the clear meaning of a specific statutory provision.”). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013) 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1278 (2014) (“’[W]hen the statute's language is plain, 
the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the 
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The important point is that judges approach interpretation by a 
comprehensive and coherent process that depends on 
specialized tools to update their assessment of the likelihood 
that the words have particular meaning.   
Members of Congress do not rely primarily on judicial 
methods of interpretation. When enacting legislation, those 
legislators with an interest in the bill and an institutional role 
in helping draft it negotiate a bargain with others who have an 
interest in the legislation.88 After a bargain is reached, 
legislators communicate that bargain to staff members who are 
tasked with drafting language to implement it.89  After 
language is initially drafted, it is distributed to representatives 
of various affected interest groups — which may include groups 
representing private entities subject to the statute’s provisions, 
groups of individuals who are meant to be protected by the 
statute, administrative agencies, and members of White House 
staff.90  These representatives then look closely at the language 
and try to ensure that it will not affect them in ways that differ 
from the original legislative bargain. This process of interest 
group vetting of bills is likely to catch many potential problems 
stemming from how the bills are worded.91 Once those 
problems are brought to congressional staff’s attention, the 
language can be changed to better reflect the bargain to which 
the negotiating legislators agreed.  Moreover, congressional 
staff members who draft the legislation take judicial tools of 
interpretation into account when reducing the bargain to 
statutory language.92  Thus, with respect to any particular 
 
test is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’”) (quoting Lamie v. 
U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, (2004)); United States v. Desposito, 704 F.3d 
221, 226 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2402 (2013) (“In construing a 
statute, we begin with the plain language, giving all undefined terms their 
ordinary meaning.”); Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 134 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (“We assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language 
expresses the legislature's intent. . . .”). 
 88. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 496–97. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 497. 
 91. Id. at 497–98 
 92. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside--An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, 
and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 928–30 (2013) (noting that 
although congressional staff members are not aware of many semantic canons 
by name, their consideration of the meaning of statutory language is 
consistent with most such canons); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The 
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
575, 603 (2002) (reporting that attorneys in the Office of Legislative Counsel 
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interpretive question, the probability that judicial 
interpretation leads to a reading contrary to legislators’ 
understanding of what they enacted is not great.  But, the 
legislative process for determining statutory meaning during 
the drafting process never performs a step-by-step 
comprehensive judicial-type interpretative analysis on all, or 
even most, of the statutory provisions that Congress includes in 
a statute.93 Therefore, situations will arise when the legislative 
process will not catch language that judicial methods of 
interpretation is likely to interpret contrary to the 
understanding of most legislators. When the interpretive 
mechanisms of the legislative and judicial communities produce 
different statutory meaning, the situation can be characterized 
as legislative process failure. 
B. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE AND THE NEED TO 
COORDINATE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETIVE 
METHODS 
 The legislative process failure theory of statutory 
interpretation asks how the legal system should address such 
failure.  If Congress is the branch that gets to make the law, 
the law must comport with the intent of those who voted for it. 
As Joseph Raz reasoned: “It makes no sense to give any person 
or body law-making power unless it is assumed that the law 
they make is the law they intended to make.”94  Therefore, 
legislative supremacy requires that the judiciary and Congress 
come to some accommodation to ensure that courts interpret 
statutes in accord with legislators’ understanding. But, as John 
Manning has noted, such intent can be objective: the requisite 
legislative intent exists if “legislators intend to enact a law that 
will be decoded according to prevailing interpretive 
conventions.”95 In other words, legislative law-making 
supremacy is satisfied as long as Congress knows how courts 
 
felt that they had internalized the canons of interpretation). 
 93. “While staffers [of the Senate Judiciary Committee] are well aware of 
the general principles of statutory interpretation and do have in mind 
generally how a court would interpret language they are writing, in the 
ordinary course of drafting they do not spend substantial time anticipating or 
attempting to research the judicial application of particular interpretive law to 
the bill being drafted.”  Nourse & Schacter, supra note 92, at 600.     
 94. Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: 
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).   
 95. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 
419, 432–33 (2005).   
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will interpret statutes and can adjust its process to ensure that 
statutes will be interpreted as it intends.96 But, there are 
reasons why the legislature cannot generally be expected to 
acquiesce in the judicial method of decoding statutory meaning.   
Essentially, the difference between congressional and 
judicial interpretive conventions raises the question in any 
particular case: which institution should accommodate the 
other’s decoding convention?97  For the legislature to 
accommodate judicial interpretive methodology would obligate 
it to perform a judicial type analysis for every potentially 
problematic statutory provision. By doing so, Congress can 
check that the words it enacts, when interpreted by courts in 
particular cases, will implement the bargain it has struck. If 
Congress finds that the words of a bill fail to implement the 
bargain, it can change them. For the courts to accommodate the 
legislative methodology would require that courts give credence 
to context that reveals the most likely understanding of the 
legislators who voted for the statute.  Which branch should 
accommodate the other should depend on the costs of each 
accommodation.  
Textualists emphasize that there are costs of considering 
evidence of subjective intent that can be manipulated.  For 
example, individuals involved in the drafting process may be 
able to salt legislative history with clues to support meaning 
inconsistent with the statute’s underlying legislative bargain.98  
In addition, Textualists claim that a consistent set of rules tied 
to use of language constrain judicial interpretive discretion, 
and thereby reduce judges’ ability to read statutes to further 
their personal policy preferences.99 To the extent that context 
may be more difficult to read than text, it may allow judges to 
pick the meaning that they ideologically prefer. In many 
instances, however, rules about how to use context, including 
 
 96. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 500. 
 97. Id. at 501. 
 98. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 
1287, 1311–18 (2010) (detailing objections to use of broad statutory purpose as 
effectively overriding legislative bargains that are reflected in statutory text); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: 
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 
1305 (1990) (describing the textualist critique that crediting legislative history 
when interpreting statutes lowers the costs of special interest rent-seeking in 
the legislative process). 
 99. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in 
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62, 65 (1988); see also 
Molot, Rise and Fall, supra note 86, at 9. 
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legislative history, may be sufficiently constraining, and such 
use may provide sufficiently clear evidence of a likely 
legislative consensus, that the relative costs of contextual 
inquiry into subjective understanding will not be great.100   
On the other side of the ledger is the burden imposed on 
the legislature of having to resort to judicial type analysis of all 
statutory provisions of questionable meaning. Imposing this 
burden on Congress essentially mandates procedures for 
statutory enactment beyond those required by the Constitution 
that can greatly interfere with the legislature’s law-making 
function.101 In any particular case, it often takes some of the 
brightest legal minds many hours to apply judicial tools of 
construction to determine an objective best reading of a statute. 
And the court does so only in response to a legal complaint, 
which essentially signals a potentially problematic statutory 
provision for which the legislative and judicial interpretive 
approaches might lead to different meanings and focuses 
inquiry on a discrete interpretive question.  Congress, however, 
must attach meaning at the time it enacts a statute; it cannot 
take advantage of the experience from application of the 
statute and a legal complaint to signal potential legislative 
process failures. But, without signals from those subject to the 
statute, Congress would have to perform a judicial-type 
analysis with respect to any term of the statute that potentially 
might lead to a difference between legislative and judicial 
understandings.102  Essentially, requiring Congress generally 
to accommodate judicial-type decoding would place such a great 
burden on the legislative process that it would almost certainly 
shut that process down.103  
 
 100. Many scholars reject the claim that Textualism is more constraining 
of judges than intent-based interpretation.  See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting 
the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving 
Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 206–07 (1999) (questioning whether 
textualism has increased predictability and certainty of statutory 
interpretation); Robert G. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of 
Legislative History on Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 39–41 (1996) (concluding after analysis of several British 
cases that relying on legislative history to help identify statutory purpose can 
constrain judicial discretion). 
 101. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 503 
 102. Staff members from Office of Legislative Counsel, which is supposed 
to ensure that statutes implement the deals struck by the legislators, report 
that they do not have the time to perform “top-to-bottom review complete with 
comprehensive interpretive  analysis of every bill the office helps to draft.” 
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 92, at 604. 
 103. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 504; see also, Nourse & Schacter, 
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Balancing the error costs from reliance on contextual clues 
against the pragmatic costs of the legislature having to perform 
judicial analysis on all statutory provisions therefore strongly 
suggests that the courts should accommodate the non-
sequential legislative process when the legislature is unaware 
that courts would likely interpret the language differently than 
legislators understood it.104  The balance changes, however, 
when legislators have a clear signal that particular statutory 
text might not accurately reflect legislators’ understanding.  
First, once the legislature identifies a problematic statutory 
provision the cost of legislative correction is, at most, 
comparable to that of the judiciary. 105 Attorneys in Legislative 
Counsel’s Office can analyze the problematic provision just as a 
judge would to determine meaning, identify what might create 
the unintended meaning, and add language to clarify the 
meaning.  Often, armed with this identification, Congress need 
not perform a judicial analysis at all; it need only add clarifying 
language – the kind of language that often gets inserted in 
legislative history. Although such drafting is not a trivial task, 
it becomes manageable once one identifies the precise bargain 
being struck and focuses on the particular provision meant to 
incorporate that bargain. Second, the costs of manipulation of 
contextual evidence increases when the legislature is aware of 
a process failure.  Declining to change the language of a bill in 
the face of known process failure indicates a strong probability 
that the bill sponsors could not get the change passed using the 
Constitution’s specified procedures for enacting legislation.106  
The legislative process theory of statutory interpretation 
thus counsels that when the legislature is unaware of the 
potential for courts to interpret a statutory provision contrary 
to the bargain the legislature meant to strike, the courts should 
look for contextual indications of subjective legislative intent to 
guide them in determining the meaning that legislators likely 
ascribed to the language of the provision. When, however, the 
legislature is aware that a provision poses a likely legislative 
process failure, the courts should engage in judicial type 
inquiry into the objective meaning of the provision.  
 
supra note 92, at 619–20 (“[T]he sheer diversity of approaches to the drafting 
process, the multiplicity of drafters, and the different points in time at which 
text is drafted suggest the limited disciplinary effect of judicial rulings.”). 
 104. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 507–08. 
 105. Id. at 507. 
 106. Id. at 507–08. 
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III.  LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE THEORY APPLIED 
TO TAX CREDITS ON FEDERALLY CREATED EXCHANGES   
Before turning to contextual evidence of legislators’ 
understanding of the eligibility of federally created Exchanges 
for tax credits, one must answer two questions. First, what is 
the evidence of process failure – that is, that members of 
Congress likely understood the Act to authorize tax credits for 
buyers in a federally established Exchange, even if a Textualist 
analysis of the language might lead to the opposite conclusion? 
Second, what would explain Congress’s failure to see the 
potential inconsistency between that understanding and a 
reading using a Textualist technical analysis that might lead to 
the opposite conclusion? 
On the first question, one important bit of evidence is that 
a first-blush reading of the statute would support that 
understanding.  Section 1321 seems to say that federally 
created Exchanges substitute for state established ones in all 
respects. To undermine that as the best reading of the statute, 
one has to note that section 1401 used the term “Exchange 
established by a state under section 1311,” instead of simply 
refer to an Exchange, in the two provisions addressing 
premium tax credits.107  But, that happenstance alone does not 
indicate with any clarity that the phrase “established by a 
state” was meant to be significant rather than reflecting a 
simple inadvertent inclusion of language unrelated to the 
legislative bargain about premium tax credits. To gain 
confidence that the phrase was meant to be significant, one 
would next have to verify that provisions of section 1401 that 
did not address tax credits did not include “established by a 
state’ as a modifier of Exchange.  Further, one would have to 
look at all the times outside of section 1401 that the statute 
used the phrase “established by the state” to see whether they 
too could be explained by some rational distinction between 
state and federal exchanges.108  Such an inquiry is fraught with 
 
 107. See supra notes 20, 35, 37 and accompanying text. 
 108. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Test to Textualism in King v. 
Burwell: A Reply to Abbe Gluck, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/12/the-test-to-
textualism-in-king-v-burwell-a-reply-to-abbe-gluck/ (relying on consideration 
of every use of the term “established by the State” and reporting that each  
“serve[s] to facilitate coordination between state exchanges and other 
programs or to provide incentives for state action”); see also Amy E. Sanders, 
Note, A Gap in the Affordable Care Act: Will Tax Credits Be Available for 
Insurance Purchased Through Federal Exchanges, 66 VAND. L REV. 1259, 
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the need to think creatively about all the possible reasons one 
might want to distinguish between these types of exchanges. 
For example, in response to the government’s argument that it 
makes no sense to limit a state’s abilities to modify eligibility 
for its Medicaid programs forever if a state decided not to 
establish an Exchange, the Halbig panel majority came up with 
the response that such a limitation might make sense if the 
Exchange in the state was created by the federal government to 
make up for the fact that, under the panel’s reading, 
individuals in that state would not be able to obtain premium 
tax credits109 –an argument that seems a bit speculative in 
light of the fact that such tax credits were an important part of 
making health care affordable to many more people than those 
who might currently be receiving Medicaid benefits. Moreover, 
this technical inquiry to overcome the understanding that most 
likely would follow from a casual reading would have had to be 
made over the entirety of one of the most long and complex 
statutes in the history of congressional enactments.110  One 
cannot reasonably expect members of Congress to perform such 
inquiries on an issue that, at the time of enactment, was not 
even on anyone’s radar screen.  
In addition, it seems odd that Congress would bury such an 
important distinction between Exchanges created by the 
federal and state governments in a technical provision that 
describes how to calculate the tax credit.  And it seems odder 
still that it would do so in a manner that would require a 
complex analysis of the entire statute to conclude that such 
credits were available only on state established Exchanges. The 
Supreme Court has stated, in a different context, that Congress 
does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”111 If so, Congress 
would not resolve a major issue that drives an entire statute 
using subtle semantic signals in a section of the Act that 
specifies the details of calculating a tax credit.  Yet it is 
precisely in such semantic technicalities that the Halbig panel 
 
1287–88 (2013) (identifying references to section 1311 that do not make sense 
unless applied to federal Exchanges established under section 1321). 
 109. See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 405–06 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en 
banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 4, 2014). 
 110. The Act runs 906 pages in the Statutes at Large, not including the 
subsequent amendments enacted nominally as part of the budget 
reconciliation process. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119-1024 (2010). 
 111. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
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majority locates its inquiry into whether premium subsidies are 
available on federal created Exchanges.112   
On the second question, there are good reasons to believe 
that Congress was unaware of the potential question regarding 
tax credits on federally created Exchanges. The Senate bill was 
drafted with the expectation that it would be merged with the 
“Affordable Care for America Act” that had passed the House, 
and which would have established a national insurance 
exchange from which states could opt out.113  But Scott Brown’s 
election to the Senate assured a filibuster of any change to the 
Senate bill that might be made by a Conference Committee 
other than some modifications that could be squeezed into the 
budget reconciliation process.114  This reality essentially forced 
the Democrats to enact the Senate Bill as the ACA, with no 
opportunity to clean up any sloppy drafting.  Hence the Senate 
bill was not vetted as carefully as it might have been had those 
involved in its drafting expected it to become the law.   
The fact that the legislative history is totally silent on this 
precise question also supports the inference that Congress was 
unaware that the language of section 1401 was problematic. 
For example, the letter from the Texas Congressional 
Delegation, which Adler and Cannon see as evidence that 
Congress intended to restrict premium tax credits to state 
established exchanges,115 is best viewed as circumstantial 
evidence that the representatives did not envision that 
participation in federally run Exchanges would disqualify 
taxpayers from obtaining tax credits. Its detailed and 
comprehensive diatribe outlining the disadvantages of the 
Senate bill never mentions the loss of tax credits under 
federally run Exchanges as such a disadvantage.   
Given the answers to these two preliminary questions, the 
legislative process theory of statutory interpretation counsels 
 
 112. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 399–402. 
 113. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 
301 et seq. (as passed by House of Representatives, Nov. 7, 2009), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c111:./temp/~c111iF4Up3.  
 114. See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate 
About the Affordable Care Act, 80 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 45, 51 (2011); Jonathan 
Cohn, How to Pass the Bill--Whatever Happens Tuesday, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 
17, 2010), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/the-treatment/what-do-if-coakley 
-loses-contd; see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (amending the ACA, which had 
been based on the Senate Bill, in ways that escaped a filibuster because they 
could be construed as budget reconciliation). 
 115. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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reliance on contextual evidence of the subjective meaning that 
legislators most probably ascribed to the ACA with respect to 
tax credits for federally created Exchanges. As noted in the 
discussion of legislative history above,116 that history fails to 
discuss this precise issue at all, but it nonetheless illuminates 
the likely understanding of legislators on that issue.  The 
general discussion of federally created Exchanges in the 
legislative history assumes that those Exchanges will 
substitute for one created by the state when the state fails or 
refuses to create an Exchange.117 In addition, this assumption 
is also reflected in both scholarly and media accounts of how 
the ACA would operate.118 Thus, the best evidence from the 
 
 116. See supra notes 107–16 and accompanying text. 
 117. The legislative history does not reveal that much attention was paid to 
the federally created Exchange fallback, perhaps because most members of 
Congress expected states to establish their own Exchanges. See, e.g., 155 
Cong. Rec. 33,004 (2009) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu) (“[T]here is no 
government-run public option in this bill. Instead, we reached an agreement to 
provide private health insurance plans to be sold nationwide. . . .  Importantly, 
we ensured that at least one nonprofit plan will be offered in every State 
exchange and that the States cannot opt out at the whim of every Governor 
and legislature.”). Nonetheless, the few references to federally created 
exchanges manifest a general understanding that these exchanges would 
simply step into the shoes of those that otherwise would be established by the 
state.  See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. 32,996 (2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) 
(“[T]he legislation orders states to establish health benefit exchanges which 
will require states to pass legislation and regulations. If they do not, or even if 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services believes they will not by a 
certain date, the Secretary will literally step into each state and establish and 
operate this exchange for [the states].”) (emphasis added); 155 Cong. Rec. 
S13832 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (“[O]ur bill 
fundamentally gives States the choice to participate in the exchanges 
themselves, or if they do not choose to do so, to allow the Federal Government 
to set up the exchanges . . . .”); S. Rep. No. 111-89, at 18–19 (2009) (“By no 
later than July 1, 2013, a state would be required to establish and have in 
operation one or more exchanges . . . that meet the requirements regarding the 
offer of QHBPs. If states do not establish these exchanges within 2 years of 
enactment (or if the Secretary determines the exchanges will not be 
operational by July 1, 2013), the Secretary would be required to contract with 
a nongovernmental entity to establish the exchanges within the state. States 
would be required to establish interim exchanges for use by state residents as 
soon as practicable in the period from January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2013. If 
these interim exchanges are not operational within a reasonable period after 
enactment, the Secretary would be required to contract with a 
nongovernmental entity to establish state exchanges during this interim 
period.”) (emphasis added). 
 118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value 
of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 
144–150 (2011) (“[R]esponsibility for the Exchanges is assigned first to states, 
with the federal government as a backstop, should states fail to comply.”); 
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legislative history and popular discussion of federally created 
exchanges is “the dog that didn’t bark”:119 none of the few 
discussions about the relative advantages of a state 
establishing its own qualified Exchange versus letting HHS do 
so, whether in legislative history or in the media, mentioned 
differential availability of tax credits Yet, this issue threatens 
to undermine entirely the operation of the ACA. Silence on this 
issue makes sense only as evidence that members of Congress 
did not understand section 1401 to operate as Adler and 
Cannon or the Halbig panel majority have argued.  
In addition to the significance of Congressional and media 
silence about the precise issue, another contextual indication 
that Congress understood section 1401 to operate as the IRS 
 
Henry Aaron, State Needs Action On Health Reform: Don't Accept One-Size-
Fits-All Approach on Exchanges, STAR TRIBUNE, 
http://www.startribune.com/opinion/editorials/111293694.html (last updated 
Dec. 5, 2010) (stating that federal dollars that the state would forego by not 
promptly establishing an exchange, but not mentioning lost subsidies as such 
costs); Robert Pear, Health Care Overhaul Depends on State’s Insurance 
Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010 at 23N  (“Federal officials . . . will run 
the exchange in any state that is unwilling or unable to do so.”); Carrie 
Teegardin, A New Way to Insure Public, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 26, 2010, 
at A1 (“Officials in every state can design and run their own exchange, or 
simply punt the task to Washington.”). There is also some evidence, prior to 
the subsidy issue being raised in the IRS rulemaking, of a general expectation 
that subsidies would be available on federally established exchanges. For 
example, “neither the Congressional Budget Office score nor the Joint 
Committee on Taxation technical explanation of the Affordable Care Act 
discusse[d] excluding those enrolled through a Federally-facilitated exchange.” 
Letter from Douglas H. Shulman, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv., to David 
Phil Roe, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 29, 2011), 
available at http://roe.house.gov/uploadedfiles/irs_response_to_letter_on_ 
ppaca_ exchange.pdf;  see also Pear, supra (noting that “federal subsidies, to 
help pay for insurance, will be available only to people who enroll in health 
plans through an exchange,” and later stating that the federal government 
“will run the exchange in any state that is unable or unwilling to do so”); Doug 
Trapp, California First to OK Insurance Exchange Outlined Under Health 
System Reform, AM. MED. NEWS (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.amednews 
.com/article/20101018/government/310189955/1/ (“People earning between 
133% and 400% of [the federal poverty level] will be eligible for private 
coverage subsidized on a sliding scale. . . . If states do not create an insurance 
exchange, the federal government will offer one in the state.”).  But see, James 
Coburn, Commission Wades Through New Health Regulations, EDMOND SUN 
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.edmondsun.com/news/local_news/commission 
-wades-through-new-health-regulations/article_dde2cf27-b941-54fe-8b3c 
-03dfac99413c.html (“There is no obligation for states to be in the health 
insurance exchange. . . . But none of the incentives or subsidies being offered 
are applicable without the exchange.”). 
 119.  Cf. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF 
SHERLOCK HOLMES 22 (1894), available at https://books.google.com/. 
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interpreted it is the lack of any plausible story about why 
Congress would limit subsidies to state created Exchanges. As 
Adler and Cannon suggest, the only reason for denying tax 
credits to purchasers on federally created Exchanges would be 
to encourage states to establish Exchanges.120 Essentially, one 
could read section 1401 as creating a cudgel with which the 
federal government could threaten states, thereby inducing 
them to establish Exchanges. But, the ability to get one’s way 
by carrying a big stick depends on others knowing that one 
wields it.121 Hence, while an intent to encourage states to 
establish exchanges might make sense in the abstract, it is 
belied by Congress’s failure to make the existence of this cudgel 
known. 122  
  CONCLUSION   
What one makes of the contextual analysis this Essay 
provides drives the story one will derive from that analysis.  
One might conclude that the statutory provisions are too 
consistent to be the result of pure coincidence. Even so, the lack 
of any direct discussion of the different tax credit treatment of 
federally run Exchanges makes it highly unlikely that those 
who voted for the bill understood it to mandate denial of such 
credits.  Two more likely scenarios are: that the sections were 
drafted by different groups of congressional staff members who 
failed to coordinate what they were doing – essentially that 
drafters of section 1401 believed that section 1321 would clarify 
that federally run Exchanges stand in for state run ones in 
 
 120. Adler and Cannon report that initially they thought the wording of 
section 1401’s tax credit provisions was inadvertent.  Adler & Cannon, supra 
note 24, at 123. They claim to have found subsequently that restricting 
subsidies was meant to encourage states to establish their own exchanges. Id. 
at 151–54.  No other possible rational for the distinction between credits on 
federally and state created Exchanges has been suggested.  
 121. Thus, President Theodore Roosevelt, who popularized the expression 
“speak softly but carry a big stick,” made sure to send the United States Navy 
around the world so that others knew of the United States’ military 
capabilities. See Mike McKinley, The Cruise of the Great White Fleet, NAVY 
HIST. HERITAGE COMMAND (Dec. 18, 2014, 7:13 AM), http://www.history.navy 
.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/cruise-
great-white-fleet-mckinley.html.  
 122. This is in stark contrast to the Act’s attempts to get states to expand 
Medicaid.  In trying to induce states to adopt such an expansion, the statute 
explicitly expanded obligations of states under the existing Medicaid program, 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012), and the existing program clearly 
provided that states could lose all Federal contributions to Medicaid for failing 
to meet those obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).   
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every respect while drafters of section 1321 believed that 
section 1401 would directly indicate inclusion of federally run 
Exchanges;123 alternatively, that those who actually chose the 
language of the Senate bill meant to exclude tax credits for 
purchasers on federally run exchanges, but did not want to 
reveal this intent for fear that the full Senate would not accept 
it.  As recent studies demonstrate, it may be easier for 
legislative staff and interest groups to hide their own agendas 
in the text of a complex bill than to hide it in legislative 
history.124  In either case, the story told by contextual analysis 
leads to rejection of a technical reading of the ACA that would 
deny tax credits to purchasers on federally run exchanges.  
 
 
 123. Cf. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 92, at 954 (reporting that 
congressional staffers are well aware of the canons of consistent usage of 
terms within a statute and reading statutes to avoid superfluities, but reject 
such canons as unreliable because they do not reflect the fragmented nature of 
how statutory text is drafted). 
 124. See id. at 967–68 (“[S]taffers who draft legislative history may be tied 
more closely to elected members than the staffers who draft statutory text.”); 
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 92, at 585 (statutory text is principally drafted 
by congressional staff). 
